Publikationsliste KOPS

How does European integration affect the welfare state? This paper argues that European integration has non-complementary consequences for the political economy of welfare spending: European economic integration increases popular demand for social spending, whereas European political integration decreases the supply of social spending. Thus, the conflicting implications of European integration essentially break the link between social policy preferences and social policy. Using statistical models that deal with the multilevel structure of the theoretical argument, we find a positive relationship between economic integration and support for social policy. In the second part of the empirical analysis, dynamic model specifications at the country level show that higher levels of political integration are associated with lower levels of social spending. Furthermore, we provide evidence that social policy responsiveness declines as political integration increases.

We use German KiGGS data to add to existing knowledge about trends in vaccination-related attitudes and behavior. Looking at vaccinations against measles, we assess whether a low confidence in vaccination and vaccination complacency is particularly prevalent among parents whose children were born somewhat recently, as compared to parents whose children belong to earlier birth cohorts. We further analyze how these attitudes relate to vaccination rates in the corresponding birth cohorts, and which sociodemographic subgroups are more likely to have vaccination-hesitant attitudes and to act upon them. Results show that the share of parents who report "deliberate" reasons against vaccination has decreased across birth cohorts; at the same time, the children of these parents have become less likely to be vaccinated. This suggests that vaccination-hesitant parents became more willing to act upon their beliefs towards the turn of the millennium. Regarding efforts to convince parents and the public about the benefits of vaccination, the number of parents who think that vaccinations have serious side effects, or that it is better for a child to live through a disease, may have become smaller-but these parents are more determined to follow their convictions. Interestingly, the trend we describe started before the Internet became a widespread source of health-related information.

The nascent literature on the political consequences of technological change studies either left-behind voters or successful technology entrepreneurs ("superstars"). However, it neglects the large share of skilled workers who bene t from limited but steady economic improvements in the knowledge economy. This paper examines how workplace digitalization a ects political preferences among the entire active labor force by combining individual-level panel data from the United Kingdom with industry-level data on ICT capital stocks between 1997-2017. We rst demonstrate that digitalization was economically bene cial for workers with middle and high levels of education. We then show that growth in digitalization increased support for the Conservative Party, the incumbent party, and voter turnout among bene ciaries of economic change. Our results hold in an instrumental variable analysis and multiple robustness checks. While digitalization undoubtedly produces losers (along with some superstars), ordinary winners of digitalization are an important stabilizing force content with the political status quo.

What kind of welfare state do voters of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) want and how do their preferences differ from voters of mainstream left- and right-wing parties? In this paper, we draw on an original, representative survey of public opinion on education and related social policies in eight Western European countries to measure (1) support for social transfers, (2) support for workfare and (3) support for social investment. Challenging the view that PRRPs turned into pro-welfare parties, our results indicate that their voters want a particularistic-authoritarian welfare state, displaying moderate support only for ‘deserving’ benefit recipients (e.g. the elderly), while revealing strong support for a workfare approach and little support for social investment. These findings have important implications for contemporary debates about the future of capitalism and the welfare state.

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COVID-19 vaccination rates slowed in many countries during the second half of 2021, along with the emergence of vocal opposition, particularly to mandated vaccinations. Who are those resisting vaccination? Under what conditions do they change their minds? Our three-wave representative panel survey from Germany allows us to estimate the dynamics of vaccine opposition, providing the following answers. Without mandates, it may be difficult to reach and to sustain the near-universal level of repeated vaccinations apparently required to contain the Delta, Omicron, and likely subsequent variants. But mandates substantially increase opposition to vaccination. We find that few were opposed to voluntary vaccination in all three waves of the survey. They are just 3.3% of our panel, a number that we demonstrate is unlikely to be the result of response error. In contrast, the fraction consistently opposed to enforced vaccinations is 16.5%. Under both policies, those consistently opposed and those switching from opposition to supporting vaccination are sociodemographically virtually indistinguishable from other Germans. Thus, the mechanisms accounting for the dynamics of vaccine attitudes may apply generally across societal groups. What differentiates them from others are their beliefs about vaccination effectiveness, their trust in public institutions, and whether they perceive enforced vaccination as a restriction on their freedom. We find that changing these beliefs is both possible and necessary to increase vaccine willingness, even in the case of mandates. An inference is that well-designed policies of persuasion and enforcement will be complementary, not alternatives.

Contact restrictions and distancing measures are among the most effective non-pharmaceutical measures to stop the spread of the SARS-CoV2 virus. Yet, research has only begun to understand the wider social consequences of these interventions. This study investigates how individuals' social networks have changed since the outbreak of the pandemic and how this is related to individuals' socio-economic positions and their socio-demographic characteristics. Based on a large quota sample of the German adult population, we investigate the loss and gain of strong and weak social ties during the pandemic. While about one third of respondents reported losing of contact with acquaintances, every fourth person has lost contact to a friend. Forming new social ties occurs less frequently. Only 10-15% report having made new acquaintances (15%) or friends (10%) during the pandemic. Overall, more than half of our respondents did not report any change, however. Changes in social networks are linked to both socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics, such as age, gender, education, and migration background, providing key insights into a yet underexplored dimension of pandemic-related social inequality.

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The COVID-19 lockdown measures have challenged individuals to reconcile employment, childcare, and housework. This article addresses whether these challenges have reduced life satisfaction among German women by focusing on their labor market status and drawing upon a topical online survey (Kantar) collected in Germany at two points in time: May 2020 and November 2020. We find that part-time employed women were better protected against a decline in life satisfaction, but only during the first lockdown. Economically inactive women were most likely to experience a decline in life satisfaction during the first lockdown, but least likely during the second lockdown. Life satisfaction has further decreased between the first and the second lockdown, and the likelihood of a decrease has converged for full-time, part-time, and economically inactive women.