Publikationsliste KOPS

How do the impacts of acute crises influence citizens’ willingness to support different types of climate measures? An acute crisis can be understood either as an impediment or as an opportunity for climate change mitigation. In the first perspective, crisis impacts would create negative spill-overs and dampen citizens’ willingness to support climate action, while in the second perspective, the opposite would occur. Based on a survey experiment fielded in Germany in 2022 ( n  = 5438), we find that the economic implications of the Russo-Ukrainian War do not decrease behavioral willingness, while restrictions of civil liberties to combat the COVID-19 pandemic lead to higher climate support, underpinning the crisis-as-opportunity perspective. Willingness to support climate measures is strongest among (1) those most concerned about climate change, and (2) those who trust the government. We conclude that individuals do not wish climate change mitigation to be deprioritized on the back of other crises.

This study examines whether transitioning from cellular offices to an activity-based flexible office (A-FO) impacts employee absenteeism over time. Based on privacy theory, we hypothesized that changing from cell offices to an A-FO setting would lead to increased employee absenteeism. We further assumed that longer-tenured and female employees would experience greater difficulty with the transition, leading to more absenteeism among these groups. Using a sample of 2,017 white-collar workers tracked over 8 years, we quasi-experimentally investigated if absenteeism in the group with the office design intervention (1,035 individuals) differed from the control group (982 individuals). In the difference-in-difference (DiD) framework, nested negative binomial regression showed no difference in absenteeism between the intervention and control groups. However, a three-way interaction revealed that long-term employees showed higher absenteeism when switching to an A-FO. We discuss our contributions and the implications for corporate leadership, human resources, and change management.

Using new data from a three-wave panel survey administered in Germany between May 2020 and May 2021, this paper studies the impact of a negative shock affecting all strata of the population, such as the development of COVID-19, on preferences for redistribution. Exploiting the plausibly exogenous change in the severity of the infection rate at the county level, we show that, contrary to some theoretical expectations, the worse the crisis, the less our respondents expressed support for redistribution. We provide further evidence that this is not driven by a decrease in inequality aversion but might be driven by the individuals’ level of trust.

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Do principals' distributive preferences affect the allocation of incentives within firms? We run a Principal-Agent lab experiment, framed as a firm setting. In the experiment, subjects are randomized in the principal or worker position. Principals must choose piece rate wage contracts for two workers that differ in terms of ability. Workers have to choose an effort level that is non-contractible. Principals are either paid in proportion to the output produced (Stakeholder treatment) or paid a fixed wage (Spectator treatment). We study how principals make trade-offs between incentive concerns (motivating workers to maximize output) and their own normative distributive preferences. We find that, despite the firm-frame and the moral hazard situation, principals do hold egalitarian concerns, as principals are on average willing to trade off their firm's performance (and so their own income) for more wage equality among their workers. The willingness to reduce inequality among workers is sensitive to both extensive and intensive margin incentives, which shows that principals' choices are shaped by incentives that they face themselves.

Politicians regularly bargain with colleagues and other actors. Bargaining dynamics are central to theories of legislative politics and representative democracy, bearing directly on the substance and success of legislation, policy, and on politicians’ careers. Yet, controlled evidence on how legislators bargain is scarce. Do they apply different strategies when engaging different actors? If so, what are they, and why? To study these questions, we field an ultimatum game bargaining experiment to 1,100 sitting politicians in Belgium, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States. We find that politicians exhibit a strong partisan bias when bargaining, a pattern that we document across all of our cases. The size of the partisan bias in bargaining is about double the size when politicians engage citizens than when they face colleagues. We discuss implications for existing models of bargaining and outline future research directions.

This article explores individual views of the purpose of education. Most existing research focuses on attitudes and policy preferences; while these types of perceptions have so far been largely overlooked due to a lack of data. Our analysis of original survey data in eight Western European countries shows that personal socioeconomic factors and ideological predispositions shape these individual opinions. Individuals with higher levels of education and income are more likely to view education as aimed at expanding knowledge as goal by itself, and less likely to view it as a tool to promote intergenerational social mobility. Left-leaning individuals are also more likely to regard education as a goal by itself, and less likely to view it as conferring useful labour market skills for the younger generation. Finally, we investigate the relationship between these different views and individual preferences for social policies. Our results show that the perception of education as promoting intergenerational mobility is strongly associated with support for passive transfers, while the perception of education as conferring marketable skills increases support for workfare policies. Social investment policies, because they are widely supported in the population, are not linked to specific views on education.

It is still a puzzling question which gender inequalities in the labour market are perceived as fair and which are not – in the eye of the beholder. This study focuses on gender differences in the perceptions of the fairness of one’s own wage and the role of the occupational context individuals are embedded in. Based on data collected from 27 European countries as part of the 2018 European Social Survey (Round 9), our study contributes to the growing field of wage fairness perceptions by analysing the role of the occupational context (measured as the share of women and the gender pay gap in the respondent’s occupation), and how it moderates gender differences in fairness perceptions. Results indicate that – overall – female workers across Europe perceive their wages more often as unfairly “too low” than their male counterparts within the same country context and occupation, and that this gender gap is more pronounced in occupations with a high proportion of women and higher levels of gender inequality. We interpret these results as an indicator of growing awareness among women regarding the persisting “unfair” gendered wage distributions.

In this article, we start out from theoretical concepts about different types of migrants that feature prominently in the immigration literature. By applying latent class analysis to a unique ‘mini-panel’ data set on recent Polish and Turkish immigrants in Germany, we identify two types of migrants that are in line with the literature, namely settlers and target-earners. We label a third group that is best described as educational target-earners: ‘young learners/professionals’. Regarding variation in these groups’ early sociocultural integration patterns, results suggest that they reflect primarily differences in migrants’ intention to stay, individual resources such as education, and opportunities for integration related to newcomers’ involvement in the educational system or labour force. In sum, migrant types – though certainly more intuitively appealing and vivid than single ‘variables’ – seem to have limited explanatory power when it comes to predicting newcomers’ early integration trajectories.

Gender segregation in fields of study represents an important explanation for gender inequalities in the labor market, such as the gender wage gap. Research shows that horizontal gender segregation in higher education persists for a variety of reasons, including women’s greater communal goals and men’s greater motivation to earn high incomes. Yet with the male breadwinner model in decline, a key question is whether women’s motivation to earn high incomes might contribute to increasing women’s participation in female-atypical fields of study. Using data from the German Student Survey over a period of 30 years, our findings show that the proportion of women enrolled in female-atypical fields of study increased from 1984 to 2015. Moreover, women’s motivation to earn high incomes mediates the effect of time on enrollment in female-atypical fields of study. Their motivation to earn high incomes might thus be a factor contributing to the disruption of gender segregation in fields of study over time. Furthermore, contrary to expectations, the motivation to earn high incomes as a driving force for women to opt for gender-atypical fields of study is not stratified by social background.

Policy reforms are often multifaceted. In the rent-seeking literature policies are usually taken as one-dimensional. This paper models policy formation using a political contest with endogenous policy proposals containing two dimensions, e.g. access and quality of education. The two dimensions provide an opportunity to trade off one policy over another to make the lobbying opposition less aggressive. In a first stage, the government proposes a reform over the two policies, and in a second stage engages in a contest with an interest group over the enactment of the proposed reform. As a result, the government makes a compromise, under-proposing in the policy the interest group opposes and over-proposing in the policy the interest group desires. Effectively, there will be strategic bundling of desired policies with undesired ones in an attempt to increase enactment probability and overall utility. We study this prediction empirically using a newly complied dataset on education legislation in the states of California, Illinois and Texas. Results suggest that stronger opposition is associated with less quality reforms. Moreover, as predicted by the model, when bundling access reforms together with quality, the negative effect is counteracted.

International solidarity is indispensable for coping with global crises; however, solidarity is frequently constrained by public opinion. Past research has examined who, on the donor side, is willing to support European and international aid. However, we know less about who, on the recipient side, is perceived to deserve solidarity. The article argues that potential donors consider situational circumstances and those relational features that link them to the recipients. Using factorial survey experiments, we analyse public support for international medical and financial aid in Germany during the COVID-19 pandemic. Our results show that recipient countries' situational need and control, as well as political community criteria, namely, group membership, adherence to shared values and reciprocity, played a crucial role in explaining public support for aid. Important policy implications result: on the donor side, fault-attribution frames matter; on the recipient side, honouring community norms is key to receiving aid.

This study investigates class inequality in homeownership and the mortgage debt burden of young adults (aged 25–35) in Israel, from the present cohort and from the 1980s. These two time points reflect the shift from a social-welfare system to a neoliberal regime. Data was drawn from the Household Expenditure Survey for the periods 1975 and 1980, as well as 2012–2013 (Israel CBS). The findings reveal that while gaps between the probability of mortgaged homeownership and outright ownership have remained remarkably stable for the low-income and middle-income classes, the high-income class has substantially improved its probability of mortgaged homeownership and decreased its probability of non-homeownership. Furthermore, the middle class has the highest mortgage debt burden. However, in late young adulthood (ages 30–40), the low class is saddled with a higher mortgage debt burden relative to income than the middle class, residing in locations with lower socio-economic status. Moreover, the high class has a higher mortgage debt burden than the middle class, when residing in areas with higher socio-economic status. This practice increases the latter’s wealth prospects and shows the financial burden imposed upon the low class in order for its members to have ‘a roof over their head’.

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dc.contributor.author: Urman, Aleksandra; Makhortykh, Mykola; Sydorova, Maryna