Publikationsliste KOPS

The spread of online misinformation on social media is increasingly perceived as a problem for societal cohesion and democracy. The role of political leaders in this process has attracted less research attention, even though politicians who ‘speak their mind’ are perceived by segments of the public as authentic and honest even if their statements are unsupported by evidence. By analysing communications by members of the US Congress on Twitter between 2011 and 2022, we show that politicians’ conception of honesty has undergone a distinct shift, with authentic belief speaking that may be decoupled from evidence becoming more prominent and more differentiated from explicitly evidence-based fact speaking. We show that for Republicans—but not Democrats—an increase in belief speaking of 10% is associated with a decrease of 12.8 points of quality (NewsGuard scoring system) in the sources shared in a tweet. In contrast, an increase in fact-speaking language is associated with an increase in quality of sources for both parties. Our study is observational and cannot support causal inferences. However, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the current dissemination of misinformation in political discourse is linked to an alternative understanding of truth and honesty that emphasizes invocation of subjective belief at the expense of reliance on evidence.

We argue that support for redistribution increases when one experiences “positional deprivation,” situations when one’s own income increases slower or decreases faster compared to that of others. This specific combination of economic suffering over-time and relative to others has effects beyond well-studied measures of suffering that are static and/or absolute in nature, such as income level. We empirically explore this hypothesis by using “objective-material” measures of positional deprivation derived from the Luxembourg Income Studies and the European Social Survey, and by using “subjective” measures derived from an original survey in 13 European countries. We find that those whose income growth is outpaced by the average and/or richest members of their country are more likely to support redistribution. We also find that the objective and subjective measures of positional deprivation are significantly correlated, and that positional deprivation’s fostering of support for redistribution holds above-and-beyond static and/or absolute measures of economic experience.

Politics is increasingly driven by identity cleavages, which also affect the discussion about inequality and redistribution. Typically, redistribution is meant to reduce inequality, implying that redistribution neither makes the rich richer nor the former poor the new rich. However, if identity affects redistribution, these limits might no longer be binding, and redistribution could further increase existing inequalities (making the rich richer) or reverse the income ordering to favor the once-poor (which can even be inequality increasing if redistribution is strong). In a laboratory experiment, we investigate redistribution via a novel smooth one-dimensional distribution mechanism that also allows for an increase or reversal of inequality. Decision-makers receive information about the recipients' political orientation, nationality, or seat number during the experiment, and we vary the structure and source of income inequality (income is either earned, random, or unfair). We find most choices of the decision-makers involve redistribution, with only 8 % of choices sticking with the status quo. While most redistribution choices reduce inequality, a larger share—(18 %)—increase inequality by making the rich richer, 13 % of choices reduce overall inequality but make the poor the new rich, and 9 % increase inequality by making the poor very rich. Thus, 40 % of decisions are redistributions that are typically unobserved in common redistribution designs. Ingroup favoritism is a strong motive for redistribution in general, and it is the most important motive for redistribution to increase or reverse inequality. Indeed, 85 % of the inequality-increasing or reversing decisions favor the ingroup. Complementary eye-tracking data show that decision-makers’ attention to information about the recipients’ groups and to poor outliers are related to higher levels of redistribution.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the youth mental health crisis has reached unprecedented levels. To which extent school closures, one of the most heavily debated pandemic measures, have contributed to or even caused this crisis is largely unknown. We seek to narrow this blind spot, by combining quasi-experimental variation in school closure and reopening strategies across the German federal states at the onset of the pandemic with nationwide, population-based survey data on youth mental health and high-frequency data from the largest crisis helpline. We show that prolonged school closures led to a substantial deterioration in youth health-related quality of life, precipitating early signs of mental health problems. The effects were most severe among boys, younger adolescents, and families with limited living space. We further provide evidence that family problems are a major issue that adolescents were struggling with when denied access to school. Overall, school closures largely explain the deterioration of youth mental health over the first pandemic wave.

Rising international migration, paired with increasing public support for far-right political parties, poses a growing challenge to the countries tasked with successfully integrating immigrants into their society. Further complicating this matter is the fact that the acculturation process which immigrants undergo to fully integrate into their host society can be long, difficult, and taxing to their mental health, physical health, and sense of belonging. A better understanding of how the unique burdens faced by immigrants might be alleviated or more easily processed is therefore vital for the success of both immigrants and their host countries. Drawing on initial findings suggesting that classic psychedelics can help individuals process incidents of discrimination, make healthier decisions, and experience deeper feelings of connectedness to others, this literature review presents a roadmap for determining what classic psychedelics may offer immigrants, a large and rapidly growing international minority group.

This study investigates class inequality in homeownership and the mortgage debt burden of young adults (aged 25–35) in Israel, from the present cohort and from the 1980s. These two time points reflect the shift from a social-welfare system to a neoliberal regime. Data was drawn from the Household Expenditure Survey for the periods 1975 and 1980, as well as 2012–2013 (Israel CBS). The findings reveal that while gaps between the probability of mortgaged homeownership and outright ownership have remained remarkably stable for the low-income and middle-income classes, the high-income class has substantially improved its probability of mortgaged homeownership and decreased its probability of non-homeownership. Furthermore, the middle class has the highest mortgage debt burden. However, in late young adulthood (ages 30–40), the low class is saddled with a higher mortgage debt burden relative to income than the middle class, residing in locations with lower socio-economic status. Moreover, the high class has a higher mortgage debt burden than the middle class, when residing in areas with higher socio-economic status. This practice increases the latter’s wealth prospects and shows the financial burden imposed upon the low class in order for its members to have ‘a roof over their head’.

We investigate how the intensity of Ramadan affects educational outcomes by exploiting spatio-temporal variation in annual fasting hours. Longer fasting hours are related to increases in student performance in a panel of TIMSS test scores (1995–2019) across Muslim countries but not other countries. Results are confirmed in a panel of PISA test scores (2003–2018) allowing within country-wave comparisons of Muslim to non-Muslim students across Europe. We provide evidence that a demanding Ramadan affects PISA test scores of Muslim students only in cohorts with a large share of co-religionists. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that shared experiences during more intensive Ramadans facilitate the formation of social capital and a social identity conducive to learning outcomes.

Scandals can cause serious damage to political parties’ brand name and reputation, which may taint all members of the party—even those not implicated in the scandal. In this article, we therefore explore how (uninvolved) politicians are likely to react to the eruption of such events. Building on a survey among UK local councilors (N = 2133), we first document the prevalence of distinct response strategies (such as distancing oneself from the scandal-hit party or redirecting attention to similar events in other parties). Then, building on a between-subject survey-experimental design, we assess the moderating roles of partisanship and scandal type. We show that a scandal in one’s own party reduces the probability of distancing oneself from the scandal-hit party (particularly among men). We also find that scandal type matters: pointing out similar scandals in other parties is less likely for sex scandals compared to financial scandals (particularly among women).

In most contemporary societies, people underestimate the extent of economic inequality, resulting in lower support for taxation and redistribution than might be expressed by better informed citizens. We still know little, however, about how understandings of inequality arise, and therefore about where perceptions and misperceptions of it might come from. This methodological article takes one step toward filling this gap by developing a research design-a blueprint-to study how people's understandings of wealth and income inequality develop through social interaction. Our approach combines insights from recent scholarship highlighting the socially situated character of inequality beliefs with those of survey experimental work testing how information about inequality changes people's understandings of it. Specifically, we propose to use deliberative focus groups to approximate the interactional contexts in which individuals process information and form beliefs in social life. Leveraging an experimental methodology, our design then varies the social makeup of deliberative groups, as well as the information about inequality we share with participants, to explore how different types of social environments and information shape people's understandings of economic inequality. This should let us test, in particular, whether the low socioeconomic diversity of people's discussion and interaction networks relates to their tendency to underestimate inequality, and whether beliefs about opportunity explain people's lack of appetite for redistributive policies. In this exploratory article we motivate our methodological apparatus and describe its key features, before reflecting on the findings from a proof-of-concept study conducted in London in the fall of 2019.

This study explores how researchers' analytical choices affect the reliability of scientific findings. Most discussions of reliability problems in science focus on systematic biases. We broaden the lens to emphasize the idiosyncrasy of conscious and unconscious decisions that researchers make during data analysis. We coordinated 161 researchers in 73 research teams and observed their research decisions as they used the same data to independently test the same prominent social science hypothesis: that greater immigration reduces support for social policies among the public. In this typical case of social science research, research teams reported both widely diverging numerical findings and substantive conclusions despite identical start conditions. Researchers' expertise, prior beliefs, and expectations barely predict the wide variation in research outcomes. More than 95% of the total variance in numerical results remains unexplained even after qualitative coding of all identifiable decisions in each team's workflow. This reveals a universe of uncertainty that remains hidden when considering a single study in isolation. The idiosyncratic nature of how researchers' results and conclusions varied is a previously underappreciated explanation for why many scientific hypotheses remain contested. These results call for greater epistemic humility and clarity in reporting scientific findings.

War and crises affect mental health, social attitudes, and cultural norms, which can exacerbate the state of long-term insecurity. With decades of armed conflict, the Democratic Republic of Congo is one example, and violence has become normalized in civilian settings. In this study, we tested the effectiveness of the NETfacts health system, an integrated model of evidence-based individual trauma treatment (Narrative Exposure Therapy [NET]) and a trauma-informed community-based intervention (NETfacts). Alongside changes in mental health outcomes (posttraumatic stress disorder, depression, social disapproval, and shame) we also investigated change in attitudes, including rape myth acceptance, stigmatization of survivors of sexual violence, and skepticism about the reintegration of former combatants. To test whether the additional community intervention is superior to individual NET alone, we implemented a randomized controlled design with six villages and interviewed a sample of 1,066 community members. Our results demonstrate that the NETfacts health system in comparison with NET alone more effectively reduced rape myth acceptance and with it ongoing victimization and perpetration. Community members of the NETfacts group also presented with less stigmatizing attitudes against survivors of sexual violence. Skepticism about the reintegration of former combatants declined in both groups. NETfacts appears to have increased motivation to engage in individual treatment. Synergizing the healing effects of individual and collective trauma exposure, the NETfacts health system appears to be an effective and scalable approach to correct degrading or ignominious norms and restore functioning and mental health in postconflict communities.

Do citizens expect candidates who hand out goods at election time to provide services once they take office? The literature provides competing views of the relationship between electoral handouts and service provision. One sees handouts as pre-payment for the vote in lieu of future services; the second understands them as signaling the candidate’s ability to provide future services. In this paper, we examine how electoral handouts may affect expectations of future service provision. We focus on the poor because they are most dependent on such service provision, and on expectations because they are more easily identified and are likely to reflect past experience. We argue the density of social ties within the community should moderate the relationship between candidates’ campaign handouts and expectations of future services. We test this argument using hierarchical models to analyze observational and experimental data from over 14,000 poor Kenyans, Malawians, and Zambians in 631 communities. We find that respondents generally view monetary handouts to be in lieu of future services. However, we also find important differences in communities with more and less dense social ties. Vote-buying is more common and seen as more acceptable in socially dense than in less dense communities. Respondents from socially dense communities are also less likely to expect future service provision; however, they do not see candidates who give handouts as significantly less likely to provide services than those who do not. Indeed, there is evidence that not providing handouts in these communities may signal the candidate’s inability to provide services. These findings highlight the importance of considering how communities’ social density affects expectations over service provision and the need to consider, more broadly, how social context affects the distributive consequences of clientelism.

The literature on social and wealth inequality has long acknowledged the importance of intergenerational wealth transmission (IWT) to inequality in homeownership tenure. However, it has paid insufficient attention to the institutional structures that moderate these inequalities. Therefore, in this study, we ask how institutional factors via differential housing finance systems and governmental housing policies, moderate the association between IWT and homeownership tenure. This is done by using the framework of housing regime configurations and mortgage market financialization. To do so, we pooled data for 20 European countries from the European Central Bank’s Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) for 2010–2017, for household heads aged 25–40. Our main findings show consistent contradiction to the welfare state–homeownership “trade-off” hypothesis: that is, when the rental market is more heavily regulated, it is actually young adults who benefited from IWT or who received higher value of IWT have a higher probability of mortgaged homeownership. Paradoxically, when housing finance institutions are more active and generous, the wealthiest young adults hold an advantage in mortgaged homeownership. Therefore, liberal mortgage markets actually serve to enable wealthier young adults to reproduce and preserve their parental wealth status. Further, when housing prices are less affordable (median mortgage-to-income ratio), those who have received a higher amount of IWT hold an advantage in mortgaged homeownership. We discuss the implications of our findings, which cut across the socioeconomic, spatial, and demographical arenas.

Following its invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s macroeconomic stability will worsen; foreign trade and Russia-bound investment will dry up; and human capital will become scarce. Russia will not fully compensate these losses with increased economic engagement with China, with particular deficiencies likely in high-tech areas for Russia. Import substitution is also unlikely to allow Russia to innovate its way out of economic isolation or escape the resource curse. As Kremlin-connected elites further dominate the impoverished economy, crony state capitalism and kleptocracy will rise. The global repercussions of Russia’s war will include commodity shocks and the attendant supply chain disruptions and inflationary pressures. In terms of FDI, the global industries in energy, auto, and consumer goods will be particularly affected. The loss of the Russian market will be less critical to sales revenues. Structurally, Russia’s forced decoupling from the global economy may lead to the fragmentation of global financial infrastructure and the formation of economically contained blocks.

The COVID-19 pandemic represents an enormous challenge for healthcare systems around the globe. Using original panel survey data for the case of Germany, this article studies how specific trust in the healthcare system to cope with this crisis has evolved during the course of the pandemic and whether this specific form of trust is associated with general political trust. The article finds strong evidence for a positive and robust association between generalized political trust and performance perceptions regarding the efficiency and fairness of the crisis response as well as individual treatment conditions. The article also shows that specific trust in healthcare remained relatively stable throughout 2020, but declined significantly in the spring of 2021.